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Canadian interests in Arctic waters are many and varied. These
interests, however, do not exist in a vacuum. Other nations, too, have
aspirations to exploit the Arctic waters either for natural resources or
for navigation. This article analyzes various theories of international
law which might reconcile these conflicting interests. The author concludes that, to date, Canada's assertion of claims in Arctic waters have
been too broad and that there are other more limited methods of protecting legitimate Canadian interests.

CANADIAN CLAIMS IN
ARCTIC WATERS
Joseph W. Dellapenna*

M

have struggled to open the Northwest Passage for
more than four centuries. During this time natural
barriers prevented it. Gradually technology has been developed which will permit regular commercial traffic to use
the Passage before the decade is out. Oil tankers are only
the first ships to attempt it. They will be followed by ships
to carry out other mineral resources and perhaps to fish.
The route may compete for maritime traffic from Europe to
the Far East.
EN

While some men struggle to open the Passage, others
have set about erecting legal barriers to replace the now
largely breached natural barriers. This paper will examine
the limits which international law imposes on such legal barriers, suggesting an optimal solution by which the realization
of the various competing interests are collectively maximized.
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CANADIAN ARCTIC

The Arctic Ocean is the smallest in the world.1 It is
unique in other significant respects. It is nearly landlocked,
and it is covered by perennial pack ice over 80% of its area.2
At least one-third of the Ocean is underlaid by continental
shelf. At numerous places the extensive shelf breaks the
water surface, forming groups of generally low islands. The
largest such group lies off the northern and northeastern
coasts of Canada. With the exception of Greenland, this group
is under Canadian sovereignty. This Canadian Arctic archipelago can be divided into two groups. South of the Parry
Channel are a number of large islands more or less close to
the Canadian mainland. To the north are the Queen Elizabeth
Islands, stretching to within 8' of the North Pole. On the
largest of these islands is the most northerly inhabited spot
on earth-the military weather station at Alert, Canada.
This vast northern region is generally described as bleak
and barren. No trees grow. Only a few stunted plants can
survive. Men have been present in the Arctic since prehistoric
times but in very small numbers. The Queen Elizabeth Islands were totally uninhabited until 1953, when the Canadian
government established several Eskimo families there.'
Survival has been difficult because of the scarcity of immediately consumable resources. Vegetation and animal life
are scarce not only because of the prevalent cold,4 but also
because of permafrost and aridity. Permafrost is a condition
where the ground is permanently frozen below a shallow zone
which may melt in summer. In some parts of the Canadian
Arctic archipelago it extends to a depth of 1800 feet or more,
1.

For clear discussions in plain terms of the geography of the region see
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GEOMORPHOLOGY 22-28

(1968); ENCYCLOPEDIA OF OCEAN-

OGRAPHY 49-55, 157-68 (1966); Pharand, Innocent Passage in the Arctic,
6 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 3, 48-51 (1968).
2. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GEOMORPHOLOGY, id. at 25. Its surface is almost entirely
frozen over from November to June with pack ice averaging 3 meters thick,
but it is not solid. Leads and polynyas occur even in winter. Pharand,
Freedom of Seas in the Arctic Ocean, 19 U. TORONTO L.J. 210 (1969).
3. BAIRD, Canadian Arctic Archipelago, in GEOGRAPHY OF THE NORTHLANDS
354 (1955).
4. The entire Canadian Arctic archipelago and adjacent mainland is within
the area where average temperatures in the warmest month are less than
50' F (100 C). By any of the various definitions used to define the Arctic,
the archipelago is entirely Arctic. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GEOMORPHOLOGY,
supra note 1, at 23-25.
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while the surface active layer is nowhere more than three feet
thick.' Primitive man could not excavate permafrost. Modern
man can only by overcoming special engineering difficulties.
These include the tendency of his construction activities to
melt the surrounding permafrost.' Despite the extensive
incidence of fresh surface water, the area is really a desert,
averaging less than 15 inches of rain per year.' The permafrost renders the underlying ground impermeable, preventing
percolation, while the cold keeps evaporation minimal. The
little water there is runs off into lakes and streams creating
an illusion of abundance. Many temperate plants would die
of thirst while surrounded by large, shallow lakes.
Commercial development of the Canadian north is becoming increasingly practical. After World War II the
region became an armed camp with United States and Soviet
bases directed at possible bomber attacks across the Arctic.8
The DEW line was built jointly by the United States and
Canada across Alaska, northern Canada, and Greenland. The
advent of ICBM's made these bases obsolete. They have been
largely abandoned. In Canada only radar installations were
developed, although overflights by bombers armed with nuclear weapons continued until 1968. Joint weather stations
did not come under complete Canadian control until 1970. A
consequence of this activity was the development of yearround technical capabilities, much of which is readily translatable into civilian uses.
The primary natural resources of the Canadian north are
minerals, oil, fishing and the promising shipping route.' Although there are special technical difficulties to mining or
drilling in the Arctic, oil has been discovered in Alaska. Oil
is also found in Canada: in the MacKenzie delta, in the Queen
Elizabeth Islands, and on the continental shelf."0 Even more
Id. at 835.
Id. at 837-38.
Id. at 28.
This is the shortest route for such attacks. For a discussion of the changing
defense posture in the Arctic see Lloyd, Canada's Arctic in the Age of
Ecology, 48 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 726, 728-30 (1970).
9. Id. at 730-32, 735-36. Agriculture, forestry, and fresh water export are
at best marginal industries. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
10. Wilkes, InternationalAdministrative Due Process and Control of PollutionThe CanadianArctic Waters Example, 2 J. MARITIME L. & COMMERCE 499,
502, 530 (1971).
5.
6.
7.
8.
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important was the opening in 1971 of the Mary's River iron
mines on Baffin Island. This is one of the richest in Canada.
Other minerals found in the area include lead, zinc, and
silver.1 Seven such mines are already open north of 60' N
latitude in Canada. Canadians entertain high hopes for even
more development of these resources. 2 The success of the
mining and petroleum industries in mastering the inhospitable
deserts a generation ago portends a similar achievement in
the far north as well. This can be expected to occur with
startling rapidity notwithstanding any reasonable governmental regulation. Fishing is only beginning to emerge as
an important industry in this area. Fish in small quantities
are found within 300 miles of the North Pole." They are found
in commercial quantities in the waters between the Canadian
Arctic archipelago and Greenland, in Hudson's Bay and other
waters claimed by Canada. 5 The quantities are increasing as
the waters warm slightly, 6 while greater competition makes
smaller stocks commercially attractive.
Modern man entered the Canadian Arctic in a search for
the Northwest Passage. From the Cabots in 1497 to St. Roch
in 1944, nearly all have been English or Canadian. The Arctic
frustrated them until the twentieth century. 7 The first all-sea
passage in a single season was achieved in 1944 by the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police schooner St. Roch.' This accom11. Id. at 530. Present known deposits of iron and zinc in the world will be
consumed by 1988, absent large-scale recycling. There are seven lead/zinc/
silver mines in Canada north of the Arctic circle. Id.
12.

BROWN, CANADA'S ECONOMIC GROWTH (1965); CARR & ASsOC., THE YUKON
ECONOMY, ITS POTENTIAL FOR GROWTH AND CONTINUITY (1970); JUDD,

YUKON STUDIES 1968 (1970); MOWAT, CANADA'S NORTH (1967); SLATER,

WORLD TRADE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: TRENDS AND PROSPECTS WITH APPLICATION TO CANADA (1968).

Lloyd, supra note 8, at 732.
Pharand, supra note 2, at 232.
Lloyd, supra note 8, at 731.
Ritchie-Calder, Mortgaging the Old Homestead, 48 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 207,
215 (1970). Some attribute this to the "greenhouse effect" of pollution,
others to long range climatic cycles. If it continues it will raise average
temperatures about 6.50 F (3.60 C) over the next half century, melting
the polar caps, raising sea levels, and changing weather patterns. As it is,
the North Polar pack is thinning and shrinking, the Arctic Ocean temperature is rising, and fish are migrating to higher latitudes. See also Pharand,
supra note 2, at 225; Detroit News, July 18, 1971, § A at 10, col. 1.
17. See Head, Canadian Claims to TerritorialSovereignty in the Arctic Regions,
9 McGILL, L.J. 200, 210-11 (1963), for a summary listing of these expeditions.
Many geographic features in the Arctic memorialize men who lost their
lives in these attempts.
18. Wordie, The Voyage of the St. Roch Through the Northwest Passage-1944,
4 POLAR RECORD 259 (1945).

13.
14.
15.
16.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol7/iss2/3

4

Dellapenna: Canadian Claims in Arctic Waters

1972

AiRcTic WATERS

387

plishment was made possible by improved technology and by
the slight but perceptible warming trend in the Arctic. Since
1944 such crossings have become frequent for an increasing
variety of ships moving in each direction.
The Northwest Passage may be through several routes
of varying difficulty.1 9 The easiest and usual passage is by
way of Parry Channel to Banks Island. This is the widest
and generally deepest of the passages." It passes through
Lancaster Sound, Barrow Strait, and Viscount Melville
Sound. The narrowest of these is Barrow Strait. Between
Young and Lowther Islands it is only 15 miles wide. The
Sounds are 25 to 75 miles wide. Beyond Viscount Melville
Sound, Parry Channel continues north of Banks Island
through M'Clure Strait. This strait is more than 100 miles
wide but suffers from severe ice conditions the year around.2 '
To avoid this, one can turn south through the Prince of Wales
Strait between Banks and Victoria Islands. This strait
ranges from 5 miles to 11 miles in width but is sheltered from
ice in the summer and early fall.2 Beyond Banks Island the
Prince of Wales Strait leads into Amundsen Gulf which is
nowhere less than 50 miles wide.
Navigation in the Arctic may be by any of three methods.
Surface drift has been used for weather and research sta19. Pharand, supra note 1, describes the various routes in considerable detail.
20. Id. More southerly routes closer to the mainland are shallower and narrower. They contain numerous small islands. The M'Clintock Channel funnels Arctic ice flows into these cramped waters, making their passage
particularly dangerous. The ice passes through M'Clure Strait and Byam
Martin Channel to M'Clintock Channel. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF OCEANOGRAPHY, supra note 1, at 158 for the circulation patterns. More northerly
routes are even less sheltered from ice. Ships using them emerge more
quickly into the Arctic Ocean proper. These routes are also narrower and
shallower than the main route. They are frequently studded with small
islands. The DEW line supply routes were generally the southern, noncommercial routes.
21. Ice conditions in the Canadian archipelago worsen as one goes from east
to west rather than from south to north. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF OCEANOGRAPHY,
supra note 1, at 157. This is due to the blocking effect of the islands. See
also METEOROLOGICAL BRANCH, CANADIAN DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
ICE SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS--THE CANADIAN ARCTIC; Dunbar, The Pattern
of Ice Distributionin CanadianArctic Seas, TRANS. ROY. SOC. CANADA, Sec.

III, No. 48 at 9-18.
22. The Manhatten was forced to use this strait when it could not force its
way through M'Clure Strait in September 1969 because of heavy ice conditions. Not even special icebreakers could force the passage. See N.Y.
Times, Sept. 15, 1969 § 1 at 1, col. 5.
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tions. 5 Subsurface navigation is possible the year around.
The layer of the Arctic Ocean between 200 meters and 900
meters below the surface has a temperature above freezing
even in winter.24 Across the Arctic Ocean proper, submarine
routes would cut 13 days off Japan to Europe shipping,
shortening the route by 4,900 miles."5 The feasibility of this
route is demonstrated by the voyages of military submarines.
Private commercial submarines have been under study for
some time, but have not yet become available." Neither of
these two techniques are particularly useful in the shallower
and more difficult passages of the Canadian Arctic archipelago. In these waters, conventional surface navigation alone
is feasible. Conventional surface navigation is possible, even
there, only in specially constructed ships and with the cooperation of the coastal states in the form of icebreakers, navigational aids, ice reconnaissance, and a workable communications network.2 7 Shipping through the Arctic waters is practical now. It has been used for military purposes for two
decades. It is beginning to be used on a large scale for nonmilitary purposes.
II.

THE COMPETING INTERESTS

In international legal disputes, a careful assessment of
the various interests asserted by the participants is necessary
23.

24.

25.
26.

27.

The Soviets average one drift per year, while the United States averages
one every two years. This does not include Fletcher's Ice Island which has
been continuously occupied by the United States since 1952, averaging a
complete revolution around the "Pacific gyral" every 6 to 7 years. See
Pharand, supra note 2, at 221.
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF OCEANOGRAPHY, supra note 1, at 53.
From a present 13,800 miles to 8,900 miles, the savings is 35%. See Pharand,
supra note 2, at 222; Note, Polar Problems and InternationalLaw, 52 AM.
J. INT'L L. 746, 748 (1958).
See, e.g., Anderson, The Arctic as a Sea Route of the Future, 115 NAT'L
GEO. MAG. 22 (1959). Changing military technology makes commercial
submarines, which were used successfully in World War I, all the more
likely to emerge in the near future. Cohen, The Erosion of Surface Naval
Power, 49 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 330 (1971). Cf. Young, To Guard the Sea, 50
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 136, 142-43 (1971).
See Pharand, supra note 2 at 223-26 for a discussion of recent developments
in such technology. Canada now maintains 200 vessels in the Arctic to
provide these services. Pharand, supra note 1, at 44-45. The number must
grow as the volume of traffic grows. The absence of these services as well
as the greater difficulties of navigation prevents conventional surface
navigation in the Arctic Ocean proper, except along the coast. The North
Pole has been reached by snowmobile. Pharand, supra note 2, at 217. It will
be some time before it is reached by surface ships. Cf. Wilkes, supra note
10? at 515.
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before any assessment of solutions is possible. The legal
system is too decentralized,2 8 the prescriptions of norms are
too informal," and the fact situations too diverse ° to allow
even the illusion of what has been called the "FormalizedDeductive Model"'" of decision-making. The unique set of
circumstances in the Arctic make the validity of even such
apparently universal norms as the four Geneva conventions 2
on the law of the sea doubtful. Local norms and traditions are
few and incomplete. Consequently, an assessment of possible
compromises among competing claims in Canadian Arctic
waters is especially dependent upon analyzing the clashing
interests of various states in that region to discover what
Canadian claims will win acceptance by foreign offices around
the world.
28. The international arena is a primitively structured legal system where
national officials alternately assert claims on behalf of their own states
and judge claims on behalf of other states, rather than requiring the resolution of these claims by disinterested third parties. This dual role makes
reciprocity the principal sanction. For a thorough examination of this
process see McDouGAL & FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER 39-40, 296-302 (1961); McDougal, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the
International Law of the Sea, 49 AM. J. INT'L L. 356 (1955). See also
GOULD & BARKUM, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1970);
McDouGAL & BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 1-88 (1962).
29. International law is found in custom, treaty, and general principles of law.
Although some place emphasis on treaties, most international law is customary, based on the acceptance, or at least the acquiescence, of most states.
It is changes by the process of claim and counter-claim described in note
28 supra. See LISSITZYN, INTERNATIONAL LAW TODAY AND TOMORROW, 4-7
(1965); Fitzmaurice, The Foundations of the Authority of International
Law and the Problem of Enforcement, 19 MODERN L. REV. 1 (1956). Whether
custom, treaty, or general principles are considered, it is essentially the consent of the nations involved which give an international norm its efficacy.
DEVIsscHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 161-62

(rev. ed. Corbett Transl. 1968).
30. FRIEDMANN, LISSITZYN, & PUGH, INTERNATIONAL LAW 82-84 (1969).
31. "[W]herein the classic syllogistic form [is] applied to continuing, repetitive
problem situations." Mayo & Jones, Legal-Policy Decision Process: Alternative Thinking and the Predictive Function, 33 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 318,
381-83 (1964). This analytical-mechanical model of legal decision making
can be described as the "slot machine theory" of jurisprudence.
32. Geneva Convention on Fishing and the Conservation of the Living Resources
of the High Seas, opened for signature April 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S.
No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285; Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone, opened for signature April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.
A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205; Geneva Convention on the Continental
Shelf, opened for signature April, 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578,
499 U.N.T.S. 311; Geneva Convention on the High Seas, opened for signature
April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 2312, T.A.I.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82. Although
Canada has ratified only one of these Conventions, it has on several occasions recognized them as generally embodying customary international law.
See, e.g., Gottlieb, Canadian Practice in International Law, 1966, 5 CAN.
Y.B. INT'L L. 253, 262-65 (1967). See also In re Dominion Coal Co. Ltd. and
County of Cape Breton, 40 D.L.R.2d 593 (1963).
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The Canadian interests in the region are clear and direct.
In possession of a suddenly rich but virtually unpopulated
north,3 3 Canada is interested in profiting from the development and exploitation of the largely mineral resources now
being unearthed. These discoveries are occurring through the
efforts of corporations controlled by non-Canadians. Thus
the control of resource development affects not only economics
but also the problem of creating a peculiarly Canadian national identity. This problem has economic, military, and
psychological dimensions. Canada has attempted to encourage
indigenous economic development by various means. One is
the creation of a Canadian owned and based oil companyPan Arctic Oil Ltd.' The regulation of the use of the Crown
lands on which the discoveries are made offers another means
of evolving towards economic independence. Militarily, Canada has not attempted to develop an independent posture.
Even now there is only one Canadian regional task force along
with air patrol activity in the area.3" Although an increase
in such activity is improbable,"6 Canada is not likely to permit the re-entrance of a major power militarily. Culturally
and psychologically, the problem of national identity is far
more difficult. By making the north their own, young Canadians may radically alter the traditional view of Canada as
a narrow strip along the northern edge of the United States,
dependent on the United States economically, politically, and
culturally. 7 Further, the growth of Canadian activities in
the north will increase Canadian contact with northern
European states and the Soviet Union.
Canada is further interested in protecting the native
people of the region. Indians and Eskimos make up half of
the local population. After centuries of neglect, they are at
33. No one this century has challenged Canadian sovereignty over the mainland
or the islands of the Canadian sector. See Head, supra note 17, at 216.
During this time, Canada has occupied the lands in question as effectively
as conditions have permitted. Id. at 213-18; see also CASTEL, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 257 (1965).
34. The Canadian government has substantial holdings (45%) in the company.
Lloyd, supra note 8, at 733.
35. Id. at 729-30.
36. Cf. Mathews, A New Atlantic Role for Canada, 17 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 334
(1969).
37. Cf. Lloyd, supra note 8, at 740. See also Bilder, The Canadian Arctic
Waters Pollution Prevention Act. New Stresses on the Law of the Sea, 69
MicH. L. Rav. 1, 4 (1970).
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long last beginning to be integrated into North America's
industrial economy. 8 To accomplish this, the removal of nonrenewable resources must be carefully regulated so that permanent employment opportunities are created. Finally,
Canada has a new-found urgency in protecting the physical
environment. Most of the Canadian north has constituted, in
effect, a wildlife preserve for over 40 years. Within the area
strict game laws are enforced. These cover not only the land,
but also the waters between the Arctic islands and a "good
measure of the open ocean to the northwest and east of the
islands., 8
All of these interests bear directly on the waters between
the Canadian lands and in the Canadian sector of the Arctic
Ocean. Canada needs to control these waters if she is to control resource exploitation in the waters and if she is to prevent
the intrusion of a foreign military power. The waters are no
less important than the land to the cultural and psychological
problems of Canadian identity. Many locals still derive their
livelihood from the water. To the extent they depend on renewable resources they may hold the long run solution to
providing meaningful employment on a permanent basis.
Finally, the Arctic environment is peculiarly susceptible to
pollution." Life is precarious at best in the Arctic. Hydrocarbons decompose very slowly. Oil would lose most of its
viscosity in the Arctic. Any pollution in the Arctic might
have disastrous and irreversible consequences. Most locally
caused pollution will occur in water,4 ' threatening both man
and animal. Additionally, in order to prevent the intrusion
of a foreign governmental presence in these waters, Canada
38.

This faces serious difficulties because of the long delays in providing basic
education and social services to the natives. Almost all the more skilled
jobs must go to outsiders. Lloyd, supra note 8,at 734.
39. Lloyd, supra note 8, at 736. Many of these were enacted as ordinances of
the Northwest Territories rather than Acts of Parliament.
40. Beesley, Rights and Responsibilities of Arctic Coastal States: The Canadian
View, 3 J. MARITIME L. & COMMERCE 1, 4 (1971); Bilder, supra note 37, at
5; Lloyd, supra note 8, at 738-39; Schachter & Serwer, Marine Pollution
Problems and Remedies, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 84, 89 (1971); and Wilkes,
supra note 10, at 501-02, 534.
41. Activities on land would be strictly localized, whereas water transports
pollution and is used for transportation of pollution causing activities. Even
in the Arctic, however, much water pollution is airborne from the distant
North American and Eurasian industrial areas. Hardy, International Control of Marine Pollution, 11 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 296, 305 (1971).
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will be burdened with providing services for ships using these
waters, whether or not they use the waters agreeably with
Canadian desires. If Canada doesn't, others will.
The interests of other nations are strictly transitory.
Any interests they have in the development of land resources
must be realized by cooperation with or intimidation of
Canada.4" Europe and Japan are interested in passing
through these waters in order to trade with each other. They
may even decide to fish the waters. The interest of the
United States in using these waters as a shipping route from
its east coast to the north coast of Alaska has been dramatically illustrated, as has its interests for naval purposes. The
Soviets have not as yet evidenced any interest in these waters
other than to deny their use to the United States or other
powers unfriendly to them. The Soviet Union may eventually desire to use the sea routes for trade between Siberia
and Western Europe."3 It may also decide to fish there. At
present, other nations have only an abstract interest in protecting the freedom of the seas.
The Canadian interests are long-term, contrasting sharply
with foreign interests in these waters. Others pass through
the region; Canadians have to live with the region. The uses
claimed as of right by other nations are essentially for transportation, a use compatible with the realization of all Canadian
interests but even more easily attained by the destruction
of Canadian interests. The complete realization of Canadian
aspirations involves placing some restrictions on uses by
others, but it need not lead to the prohibition of such uses.
Unfettered use by non-Canadians almost necessarily leads to
the limitation or destruction of Canadian interests. The problem for international law is to reconcile these imperfect compatibilities so as to realize the optimal interest mix.
42. As no one challenges Canadian sovereignty over the land (see note 33
supra) and the continental shelf, fishing is the only resource arguably not
subject to Canadian regulation.
43. Canada is presently exploring cooperative development of polar transportation with the U.S.S.R. Head, The Foreign Policy of the New Canada, 50
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 237, 250 (1972).
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ALTERATIVE SOLUTIONS

In addition to international regulation, one might suggest any of five different unilateral solutions to the problem
thus posed, each solution having several variations. Each
solution must be analzed both with respect to whether it fulfills the participants' goals and whether it is in accord with
international legal doctrine. These solutions are discussed
here in ascending order from the least to the greatest assertion of sovereignty.
A. International Regulation of Arctic Pollution
Both the United States and Canada have called for an
international conference on the Arctic to establish rules for
navigation beyond national jurisdiction." No conference to
deal specifically with the Arctic seems probable at this time,
although the question may arise at the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Environment or at the 1973 Geneva Conference
on the Law of the Sea. That no conference has been convoked
two years after the Canadian-American exchange of notes
should not be surprising. Experience with multilateral regulation of pollution and with bilateral Canadian-American
regulation of border pollution suggests that such solutions are
not to be expected even when the parties are in basic agreement as to what is to be done.
The problem of oil pollution of the sea has been recognized
since World War I. ' Efforts to solve the problem by application of customary international law have been unsuccessful.
Only ambiguous maxims which are almost meaningless as
guides for conduct46 have been prescribed by custom. Prob44. Dept. of State Press Rel. No. 121 (April 15, 1970), reprinted in 9 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 605, 606 (1970); Canadian Note of April 16, 1970, reprinted in 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 607, 614 (1970).
45. For detailed reviews of the historical evolution of multilateral efforts to
deal with this problem see COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA
430-36 (6th ed. 1967); 4 WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 687726 (1965); Gold, Pollution of the Sea and InternationalLaw: A Canadian
Perspective, 3 J. MARITIME L. & COMMERCE 13, 17-24 (1971); Hardy, supra
note 41; Sweeney, Oil Pollutionof the Oceans, 37 FORDHAM L. REV. 155, 18694 (1968); and Comment, Oil Pollution of the Sea, 10 HARv. INT'L L.J. 316,
323-38 (1969).
46. An example is sic utere tuo ut alienam non leadas (use your property so as
not to injure that of another). See, e.g., Trail Smelter Case (United States
v. Canada), 3 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1905 (1941) (a parallel situation, i.e., air
pollution).
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lems of establishing jurisdiction, proving responsibility for
a particular event, determining applicable law, and enforcing
sanctions have prevented relief.4 7 These problems go to the

very root of a system of law organized around independent
sovereignties subject only to such international authority as

they have consented to." Such authority becomes particularly
weak when the consent is only implied. Attempts to resolve

these difficulties have resulted in increasing resort to multilateral conventions.
The first convention seeking to deal with oil pollution
was drafted in 1926.11 It was not until 1954 that a convention
was drafted which could secure even one ratification." Despite certain modifications to enhance its effectiveness, this
convention was unable to stop the growth of deliberate oil
spillage into the ocean. 1 This failure appears to arise from
the convention's rigid insistence on the exclusive jurisdiction
on the high seas of the country where the ship is registered.
The adjacent coastal state is limited to merely reporting violations if they occur outside its territorial waters. A further
complicating factor is the difficulty of tracing the source of
a spill. The technical capacity to trace has existed for over
a decade. Tagging each oil cargo with a minute quantity of
47. See the examination of this problem in Jordan, Recent Developments in
InternationalEnvironmental Pollution Control, 15 McGILL L.J. 279, 285-89
(1969).
48. The limits of this theory go a long way toward explaining Canada's addition of a reservation to its acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction in the
International Court of Justice, preventing anyone from litigating its pollution laws before the Court without Canadian assent. Canadian Declaration Concerning the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice, April 7, 1970, reprinted in 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 598 (1970).
See note 187 infra. Not only must the adverse party consent to the jurisdiction, it must (implicitly at least) consent to the law. See HENKIN, Arctic
Anti-Pollution: Does Canada Make-Or Break-International Law? 65
AM. J. INT'L L. 131, 132 (1971). See generally MacDonald, The New
Canadian Declaration of Acceptance of the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the
InternationalCourt of Justice, 8 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 3 (1970).
49. Preliminary Conference on Oil Pollution of Navigable Waters (1926) T.S.
No. 736-A. See also Sweeney, s8pra note 45, at 187-89.
50. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil,
opened for signature May 12, 1954, 3 U.S.T. 2989, T.I.A.S. No. 4900, 327
U.N.T.S. 3.
51. This oil spillage is now estimated to be as high as one million tons per year,
Comment, Oil Pollutionof the Sea, 10 HARv. INT'L L.J. 316, 319 (1969).
52. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil,
art. X, opened for signature May 12, 1954, 3 U.S.T. 2989, T.I.A.S. No. 4900,
327 U.N.T.S. 3. Flags of convenience might further complicate this, although
the evidence is not clear. Comment, supra note 51, at 331-32. Cf. Sweeney,
supra note 45, at 190-91, 202.
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relatively inactive radioactive compounds would allow certain
and simple identification of oil found in the ocean." Such tagging, however, has never been required by an international
conference. Consequently, except for certain spectacular accidental spills, it is impossible to determine what ship is responsible. Deliberate deballasting continues to be the major
source of oil pollution.
A series of oil spills from ships and offshore wells led
the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization
(IMCO) 5" to convene a conference at Brussels in 1969 to
consider new protections concerning ship caused oil pollution.
It produced two conventions on such pollution." The deficiencies of these conventions, which are yet to enter into effect, point up the difficulties in achieving effective multilateral solutions. The conventions authorize a state threatened
in its territory by oil pollution on the high seas to take any
measure necessary to protect itself,"6 but only after consultations with states interested in the ship or cargo. 7 The
measures must be proportional to the threat," with the
coastal state responsible for damages caused by acts not
reasonably necessary to protect it (determined by compulsory
international arbitration)." Civil liability, again liimted to
injuries in a state's territory," is imposed except where
caused by inevitable or irresistable events, intentional acts of
third parties, or coastal state negligence in the maintenance
of navigational aids. 1 Civil liability is limited to $134 for
every registered ton and in total to $14,200,000 for each inci53. This can be done at a cost of less than three cents per ton shipped. See
Comment, supra note 51, at 354.
54. Hereinafter referred to as IMCO.
55. International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in
Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, opened for signature Nov. 29, 1969, reprinted in 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 25 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as
the Public Law Convention]; International Convention on Civil Liability
for Oil Pollution, opened for signature Nov. 29, 1969, reprinted in 9 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 45 (1970) [herinafter referred to as the Private Law
Convention].
56. The Public Law Convention, art. I.
57. Id. art. III. This is not a requisite in cases of extreme urgency.
58. Id. art. V.
59. Id. art. VI & VIII. There is no provision for compulsory arbitration for
failure to regulate one's ships.
60. The Private Law Convention, art. II. Both conventions exclude government
owned non-commercial vessels. Id. art. XI.
61. Id. art III.
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dent.62 Exclusive jurisdiction is established in the court where
the action is first brought.6 These conventions clearly establish new protections for a state whose coasts or territorial
waters are threatened by oil pollution-at least after accidents. Problems of detection and tracing of deliberate spills
are not dealt with by these conventions.
The conventions are close to the position taken by the
United States at the IMCO Conference. 4 The conventions
and the United States position represent a compromise between powerful shipping lobbies and coastal interests. As
most nations attending the conference were shipping nations,
the balance is in favor of shipping. 5 Liability is limited in
nature and amount. The coastal state bears the risk of miscalculation of danger from a spill. No technique is required
to assure the tracing of spills to the responsible parties.
Canada alone voted against the private law convention, while
it joined with several others in abstaining on the public law
convention." While various points of disagreement appear
from an examination of the Canadian position at the conference, these can be summarized as two inherent weaknesses :7 the conventions only bind the parties and only provide
remedies for pollution after it occurs. Canada has one of the
world's longest coastlines but virtually no merchant marine
of its own despite its large foreign trade. It is particularly
well situated, then, to advocate a victim oriented law to re62. Id. art V.
63. Id. art. VI. This is not so with respect to claims which cannot be litigated
in the particular court whose jurisdiction has been invoked. The Torrey
Canyon, a small tanker, caused at least $16,000,000 in actual damages.
Sweeney, supra note 45, at 197. See also Gold, supra note 45, at 22.
64. However, the United States had favored absolute liability on the ship, i.e.,
with no exceptions for inevitable events, etc. See Sweeney, supra note 45,
at 197-98.
65. Cf. Neuman, Oil on Troubled Waters: The InternationalControl of Marine
Pollution, 2 J. MARITIME L. & COMMERCE 249, 353 (1971). See also the comparison of the Draft Convention of the Comite Maritime International (a
private, largely shipping, organization) with the IMCO Conventions in
Healy, The CM1 and IMCO Draft Conventions on Civil Liability for Oil
Pollution, 2 J. MARITIME L. & COMMERCE 249, 353 (1971). See also the cornConvention did not even go as far as the shipping industry's own private
arrangements to assure private recovery. Cf. The Contract Regarding an
Interim Supplement to Tanker Liability for Oil Pollution (CRISTAL), 10
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 137 (1971).

66.

Gold, supra note 45, at 27; Legault, The Freedom of the Seas: A License
to Pollute? 21 U. TORONTO L.J. 211, 215 (1971).
67. Legault, id. at 214-16. See also Hardy, supra note 41, at 328; Newman,
supra note 65, at 352-53; and Sweeney, supra note 45, at 186-87.
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place the law oriented towards facilitating the consumption
of the seas, and to press for protection not only of commerce
but of quality of life. Her experience as an advocate in international forums, however, amply justifies a belief that
international solutions take too long for unilateral action to
await the conclusion of appropriate multilateral dispensations.
Experience with other pollutants, if anything, is worse
than the international experience in regulating oil pollution.
Apart from a few extremely general prescriptions regarding
reasonable use"8 and binding parties to cooperate in preventing pollution by radioactive or other harmful substances,"
the major conventions dealing with the sea are silent. The
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has performed
some minimal service with regard to radioactive wastes
largely by studies, reports, and the adoption of standards.
IMCO has also contributed marginally to solving these problems. Many commentators who have examined the problem
of international regulation of pollution have concluded that
the most that can be expected for some time will be international research and information exchange.7" Such international initiatives as there are, e.g., the International Seabed
Regime proposal, 1 are more likely to catalyze development
than to limit pollution.7 2 Indeed, the vision of the oil pollution conventions as prototypic of future regulation of and
68. Geneva Convention on the High Seas, art. 2, opened for signature April 29,
1958, 15 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
69. Id. art. 25. See Schacter & Serwer, supra note 40, at 108-10. Brown International Law and Marine Pollution: Radioactive Waste and "Other Hazardous Substances," 11 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 221 (1971), surveys the subject. Art. 24 prescribes similar general norms for pollution by offshore
oil drilling. See generally BOWETT, THE LAW OF THE SEA 45-50 (1967).
Other treaties also touch on the problem. See, e.g., The Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of
Mass Destruction on the Seabed and Ocean Floor, General Assembly Res.
No. 2660 (XXV), reprinted in 10 INT'L LEGAL MATER IALS 145 (1971).
70. Hardy, supra note 41, at 314; Kennan, To Prevent a World Wasteland, 48
FOREIGN AFFAMS 401, 402-03 (1970) ; Wolman, Pollution as an International
Issue, 47 FOREIGN AFPRS 164, 171-74 (1968).
71. United Nations proposal submitted by the 1971 session on Committee for
Peaceful Uses of Seabed. Press Release SB 160 Aug. 27, 1971, reprinted
in 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 973 (1971).
72. This is so because of the removal of doubt regarding authority to develop
and because pollution will be controlled, if at all, by the very same agency
whose primary responsibility is to distribute revenue earned through development of resource exploitation. See Kennan, supra note 70, at 407-08;
Krueger, The Background of the Doctrine of the Continental Shelf and the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 10 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 442, 489-90
(1970); and Mirow, The Outer Continental Shelf-Managing or Mismanaging its Resources, 2 J. MARITIME L. & COMMERCE 267 (1971).
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entrepreneurial liability for most pollution of the seas seems

reasonable and not merely because it is the only pattern thus
far devised."

Bilateral solutions do not offer a better prospect. The
United States and Canada have a long history of cooperation

on mutual problems with a fairly high degree of achievement
where their interests coincide. Lacking compulsory resort

to third party decision makers, their record where their interests are antagonistic is not better than between other
countries. In the field of pollution, they long ago in the
Boundary Waters Treaty established an International Joint
Commission on boundary waters to examine and report on
problems of utilization and pollution of these waters." The
Commission has functioned largely as a hydraulic engineering
board to pass on utilization, diversion, or obstruction of the
flow of boundary waters. Its investigative powers have only
rarely been invoked for questions of pollution. 5 The Commission lacks surveillance or enforcement machinery and
cannot invoke the domestic machinery of either party." This
dependence on voluntary compliance by the relevant national
or local governments involved has hamstrung the Commis-

sion in the performance of its duties." Up to now, the Commission has utterly failed to produce any scheme of pollution

prevention or control. The waters under its review have
deteriorated steadily. The situation in parts of Lake Erie
has become catastrophic. 8 The Commission has been simi73. Sweeney, supra note 45, at 205-06. The United States Draft Convention on
the Regulation of Ocean Dumping, reprinted in 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS
102 (1971), doesn't even go so far as the oil pollution conventions have.
74. The Boundary Waters Treaty, Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448-49 (1909), T.S.
No. 548.
75. Only six of 80 applications to the Commission before 1964 related to pollution.
Id. at 826-71. It has become more active in this area recently as the problems have become more severe.
76. The Boundary Waters Treaty, art. II, Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448-49 (1909),
T.S. No. 548.
77. Jordan, supra note 47, at 298-301; see also 3 WHITEMAN, supra note 45, at
787-88.
78. INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, Report on the Pollution of Boundary
Waters (1918); INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, Report on the Pollution
of Boundary Waters (1950); INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, Report on
the St. Croix River Basin (1959); INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, Report on the Pollution of Rainy River and Lake of the Woods (1965); INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, Interim Report on the Pollution of Lake Erie,
Lake Ontario, and the International Section of the St. Lawrence River
(1965); INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, Interim Report on the Pollution of Lake Erie, Lake Ontario, and the International Section of the St.
Lawrence River (1968).
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larly ineffective with regard to air pollution. 9 Despite the
broad language of the Boundary Waters Treaty banning pollution,80 the Canadians may justifiably conclude that the
treaty machinery is a failure which cannot produce effective
bilateral action before serious, perhaps irreparable, injury
to the environment occurs.
The interests of the United States and Canada in Arctic
waters are fundamentally opposed. Canada, through its recent laws,"1 has clearly indicated its willingness to sacrifice
passage for environmental protection. The doctrine they invoke to justify their acts is self-defense, 2 the basis which
justifies the broadest interference with innocent passage.8
On the other hand, the United States is preoccupied with
preserving free passage through all waters which have until
recently been considered high seas and in particular through
straits. In a recent statement, the Legal Advisor of the Department of State proposed the creation of a new concept in
international law-territorial waters subject to free transit
(both navigation and overflight)." The coastal state would
79. Authority over pollution of boundary airsheds apparently derives from the
spill-over of air pollution into the water. A majority of most water pollution is first airborne. Hardy, supra note 41, at 305. See 3 WHITEMAN, supra
note 45, at 840-41, 855-56, for a description of the two referrals prior to
1964.
80. The Boundary Waters Treaty, Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448-49 (1909), T.S.
No. 548. Art. IV states: "It is further agreed that the waters herein defined as boundary waters and waters flowing across the boundary shall not
be polluted on either side to the injury of health or property on the other."
81. Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, 18-19 Eliz. 2, c.47 (Can. 1970),
reprinted in 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 543 (1970), and 69 MIcH. L. REV. 38
(1970). It bars all unauthorized pollution (§ 4), imposes absolute liability
on pollutors (§§ 7, 9), authorizes regulation of land and sea activities
threatening pollution (§§ 10, 11, 12), including a ban on navigation (§ 12),
requirement of proof of financial responsibility before navigation is permitted (§ 5), and establishment of ship construction standards (§ 12).
Violation is made a crime subject to stiff ($100,000/day) fines (§18).
82. See Canadian Note, supra note 44, 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 608 (1970).
This has become a recurrent theme with Canadian commentators.
83. Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, art.
16(3), opened for signature April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639,
516 U.N.T.S. 205. See authorities cited notes 99-103 infra and accompanying
text.
84. See Statement by Mr. Stevenson to the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of the Seabed and Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, Geneva, Aug. 3, 1971, accompanying the submission of United
States Draft Articles on Territorial Sea, Straits, and Fisheries, reprinted
in 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1013, 1015 (1971). This solution is acceptable
where free navigation and overflight do not interfere with the values sought
to be maximized by the coastal state. See, e.g., The Declaration of Montevideo on the Law of the Sea, May 8, 1970, decl. 6, reprinted 9 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 1081, 1083 (1970).
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be limited to designating lanes, although special provisions
might be made for island nations. It is precisely such passage
which threatens Arctic waters. There has been almost a complete failure to avert pollution by joint Canadian-United
States efforts where they were cooperating to achieve the
same goals. It is unlikely they can cooperatively avert pollution where they seek to achieve antagonistic goals.
Canada has a long record of international cooperation."
The deficiencies of international mechanisms to prevent or
control pollution either multilaterally or bilaterally are evident. Canadian experience amply justifies Canadian refusal
to await the maturation of such mechanisms. Canada further
will not participate in any international conference on Arctic
pollution which will discuss such matters as fall" wholly within Canadian domestic jurisdiction.'"'" Apparently this would
include any substantial interference with the scope and effect
of the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act. 7 In view of
the failure of international conferences to devise mechanisms
capable of effectively dealing with even the obvious and
serious pollution at hand, this Canadian reticence is quite
reasonable.
B. The Marginal Belt
The minimal territorial water claims which are universally asserted and recognized are to a narrow belt of waters
along the actual coast of each state. By the beginning of the
twentieth century a large majority of the states of the world
had settled upon three miles as the breadth of these waters."8
Canada was committed to this breadth as a dependency of the
United Kingdom.8 9 Beginning with Imperial Russia in 1909,"0
85. See, e.g., Gottlieb, The Canadian Contribution to the Concept of a Fishing
Zone in InternationalLaw, 2 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 55 (1964).
86. Canadian Note, supra note 44.
87. For a succinct summary of the major provisions of the Act see note 81
supra.
88. For a summary of the events leading to the acceptance and later the rejection of this breadth see COLOMBOS, supra note 45, at 87-113; and McDouGAL
& BURKE, THE PuBLIc ORDER OF THE OCEANS 446-564 (1962).
89. See Regina v. Keyn, [1876] L.R. 2 Ex. D. 63; Attorney-General for British
Columbia v. Attorney-General for Canada [1914] A.C. 153; The Territorial
Waters Jurisdiction Act, 41 & 42 Vict., c. 73 (Can. 1878).
90. See BUTLER, THE LAW OF SOVIET TERRITORIAL WATERS 4-5 (1967).
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an increasing number of states have asserted broader claims.
These claims are most frequently asserted as necessary to
control fishing off the coasts of the claimant states"1 and for
security against hostile naval forces. 2 The 1958 Geneva
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone
implicitly limited the breadth of the territorial sea to twelve
miles." Since that time the twelve mile limit has become
prevalent94 with some countries asserting even broader claims.
Even the United States, long one of the staunchest supporters
of the three mile limit, has now indicated acceptance of the
twelve mile limit. 5
Canada, by legislation enacted in 1970, has extended the
breadth of its territorial sea to twelve miles.9 " At this time
such a claim seems incontestably within the limits of discretion accorded Canada by international legal decision
makers. This act itself would minimally achieve the most
important present objective of the Canadian government in
Arctic waters-control of conventional surface navigation.
Although it is possible to navigate the Northwest Passage
without coming within three miles of any Canadian land, it
isnot possible by any route to remain more than twelve miles
from Canadian land. 7 Therefore, ships using the passage
must pass within Canadian territorial waters. At that point
they must comply with Canadian laws and regulations designed to protect the "peace, good order, and security of the
91. McDouGAL & BURKE, supra note 88, at 501-04, criticize this claim at least
as to narrow water limits.
92. Id. at 482-85. Although modern naval forces can be threatening from well
beyond twelve miles, in some special circumstances territorial water limits
can confer security on the coastal state. Dellapenna, The Philippines Territorial Water Claim in International Law, 5 J. LAW & ECON. DEV. 45, 55

(1970). See also BOWETT, supra note 69, at 5-12.
93. Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, arts. 6,
24(2) opened for signature April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639,
516 U.N.T.S. 205.

94. U.N.F.A.O. Tech. Paper No. 79, Limits and Status of the Territorial Sea,
Exclusive Fishing Zones, Fishery Conservation Zones and the Continental
Shelf (1968),

reprinted 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS

516

(1969).

See also

BOWETT, supra note 69, at 13.
95. See Announcement of President Nixon on United States Oceans Policy, May
23, 1970, reprinted in 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 807, 809 (1970). The U.S.
still adheres to three miles for its own territorial waters.
96. An Act to Amend the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act, 18-19 Eliz. 2,
c. 68 (Can. 1970), reprinted in 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 553 (1970).

97. See authorities cited notes 19-22 supra and accompanying text. Cf. Bilder,
The Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act: New Stresses on
the Law of the Sea, 69 MICH L. REV. 1, 22 (1970).
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coastal State.'" Although this would not give Canada any
authority directly over such ships except in one or two narrow
straits, this would be enough to effectively close the Northwest Passage to all ships which do not meet Canadian safety
and sanitary standards.
As the waters in question would be territorial sea, Canadian sovereignty would be limited by the right of innocent passage in the international community. The coexistence of these
rights is an old and well established attempt to reconcile the
conflicting interests of coastal and maritime states."9 Thus,
any denial of passage to a foreign ship becomes a question for
international contention: is the threat to Canadian interests
sufficient to warrant the interference with the rights of
another state."' Canada further cannot suspend innocent
passage through an international strait such as the Northwest
Passage.'
Although the prevention of pollution was not
expressly mentioned in the Territorial Sea Convention as
grounds for controlling passage in the territorial sea,"0 2 the
inclusion of sanitary regulations as a basis of control outside
the territorial sea"' should be ample authority for such control within the territorial sea.
If, however, fishing becomes common in the Davis Strait
or if merchantile submarine traffic becomes common in the
Arctic Ocean proper, 0 ' this regime would not begin to pro98.
99.
100.

101.

102.
103.
104.

Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, art.
14(4), opened for signature April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No.
5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
See CoLoMa0s, THE INTERNATIONAL LAw OF THE SEA, 132-35 (6th ed. 1967);
MODouGAL & BURKE, supra note 88, at 174-304, for a discussion of these
principles.
McDouGAL & BURxE, supra note 88, at 184-86, set out clearly the difficulties
posed by such a clash of interests. As Canada will want to act before the
pollution occurs, its claim is presented in its weakest light. See also, Dellapenna, supra note 92, at 56.
Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, art.
16(4), opened for signature April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No.
5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205. Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania)
(merits), [1949] I.C.J. 4; In re Dominion Coal Co. Ltd. and County of
Cape Breton, 40 D.L.R.2d 593 (1963). See also the statement of the Canadian Undersecretary of State for External Affairs in Gottlieb, Canadian
Practice in InternationalLaw, 1966, 5 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 253, 262 (1967).
Cf. "D.C. Whitney" v. St. Clir Navig. Company, 38 Can. S. Ct. 303 (1907).
Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, art. 17,
opened for signature April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639,
516 U.N.T.S. 205.
Id. art. 24(1) (a).
Military traffic would pose pollution and other problems, but on a vastly
reduced scale as compared with submarines carrying many tons of oil.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol7/iss2/3

20

Dellapenna: Canadian Claims in Arctic Waters

1972

ARCTIC WATFRS

tect Canadian interests. Furthermore, Canada is not necessarily satisfied by a regime which, at best, compels Canada
to answer an adverse claim from its least defensible posture.
C. Historic Waters
A well recognized exception to the limitation of territorial
waters to a narrow margin is the regime of historic waters.'
Although this claim is usually discussed with reference to bays,
there is no good reason for so limiting its application."' The
doctrine of historic title is that a long continued assertion of
authority as of right over a definite area which has been acquiesced in by other states ripens into title." 7 This "concession of law to a situation of fact"'0 8 has been applied to bays
at least by all Arctic states except perhaps Denmark." 9
Canada has asserted an historic claim to Hudson's Bay
and Hudson's Strait.1 This claim is traceable to the original
grant by the English Crown to the Hudson's Bay Company
in 1670. Hudson's Bay is a body of water 600 miles wide and
900 miles long; the Strait across its mouth is 500 miles long
and 35-50 miles wide. They may be considered a single body
of water, aggregating 580,000 square miles. This is easily the
largest body claimed anywhere as an historic bay. The claim
was formally enacted into Canadian law in 1906."' Under
105. BLUM, HISTORIC TITLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1965). See also COLOMBOS,
supra note 99, at 180-88, 191-94, and McDouGAL & BuRKE, supra note 88,
at 356-72.
106. BLUM, supra note 105. Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone, art. 7(6), opened for signature April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T.
1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205, mentions historical waters only
in regard to bays, although straight baselines can be drawn with reference
to historical interests. Id. art. 4(4). Cf. Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case,
[1951] I.C.J. 116, 130-39. See Blum, supra note 105, where the doctrine
was applied not only to water, but also to land. See Case Concerning the
Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), [1962] I.C.J. 6. For a
complete discussion of historic bays see BoucHEz, THE REGIME OF BAYS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 199-302 (1964).
107. This is similar to prescription (which is sometimes used as a synonym),
but it is actually an instance of special customary international law. Acquiescence, not prescription, is the essence of the title. See BLUM, supra
note 105, at 38-39.
108. Id. at 4. Cf. BouCHEZ, supra note 106, at 238-44.
109. BOUCHEz, supra note 106, at 215-37, lists bays validly claimed by Arctic
states as historic 'waters. Cf. 4 WHITEMAN, DIGEST oF INTERNATIONAL LAW
233-58 (1965). Several of these bays, however, have entrances of less than
24 miles (the current normal closing line for bays).
110. BoucHEz, supra note 106, at 229-30; CoLOMBOS, supra note 99, at 186; 4
WHITEMAN, supra note 109, at 236-37; Balch, Is Hudson Bay a Closed or an
Open Sea? 6 AM. J. INT'L L. 409 (1912); and Johnston, Canada's Title to
Hudson's Bay and Hudson's Strait, 15 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1934).
111. CAN. STAT.C. 45, § 9(12), (1906).
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this statute, these waters would be internal for which no right
of innocent passage would exist. The United States has consistently protested this claim and does so today." 2 Americans
have from time to time fished these waters in defiance of
Canadian claims. Canada's claims to the waters in its Arctic
archipelago could also be interpreted as a claim of historic
title. Canada has asserted various measures of control over
these waters for some time. Professor Ivan I. Head has traced
the assertion of such a claim to waters north of Canada back at
least to 1938."' He further argues that effective occupation
of the land, water, and ice up to the pole has gradually consolidated over 450 years into effective title.1 14 Assertions on
the floor of parliament to this effect by cabinet ministers are
balanced by denials from like sources." 5 There is some doubt
that these assertions would be effective to notify other states
of such claims even if they were unanimous. The fixst international assertion of an historic claim by Canada appears to
have been made in a note to the United States presented on
April 16, 1970."6 Even this is not a clear assertion of historic
title, especially since Prime Minister Trudeau had disclaimed
any new assertion of sovereignty only the day before." 7
The foregoing Canadian claims to historic title illustrate
the difficulties presented by the doctrine. The evidence of
claim and counterclaim is ambiguous at best and contradictory
112.

113.

114.

HACKWORTH, DIGEST OP INTERNATIONAL LAW 700-01 (1940); 4 WHITEMAN,

supra note 109, at 237.
Head, Canadian Claims to Territorial Sovereignty in the Arctic Regions,
9 McGILL L.J. 200, 208-10 (1963). Professor Head currently is Legislative
Assistant to Prime Minister Trudeau, and largely drafted the Arctic Waters
Pollution Prevention Act.
Id. at 218-26. Cf. BLUM, supra note 105, 335-38.

Head, supra note 113, at 208-10; Pharand, Innocent Passage in the Arctic,
6 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 3, 51-52 (1968).
116. Reprinted in 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 607 (1970). The relevent passage
is as follows:
With respect to the waters of the Arctic Archipelago, the position
of Canada has always been that these waters are regarded as
Canadian. While Canada would be pleased to discuss with other
[sic] stated international standards of navigation safety and enviornmental protection to be applicable to the waters of the Arctic,
the Canadian Government cannot accept any suggestion that Canadian waters should be internationalized. Id. at 613.
117. 114 H.C. DEB. 5955 (April 16, 1970) quoting from a press conference the
preceding day, reprinted in 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 600, 601 (1970).
Bilder, supra note 97, at 7 n.21, gives a short complete discussion of the
complexities of the latest Canadian claim. See also Legault, The Freedom
of the Seas: A License to Pollute? 21 U. TORONTO L.J. 211, 219 (1971).
Mr. Legault is the head of the Law of the Sea Section, Legal Operations
Division, Canadian Department of External Affairs.
115.
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where it isn't ambiguous. Perhaps Canada's claim is better
than any counter claim.'1 8 One might just as easily, however,
invoke the doctrine that claims in derogation of general law
are viewed with disfavor and must be strictly proven by the
one so claiming. "' Even in a rare case where the "historicity"
of a claim is beyond question, serious criticisms have been
leveled at the doctrine of historic title.'
Some see it as a
device for older nations to gain advantages not available to
newer nations, 2 ' while others see in it a means of validating
titles derived from obsolete, even medieval, theories of law
which can only perpetuate conflict. In short, the doctrine
sanctifies ritual over policy, form over substance.
A different use for history in assessing the validity of
asserted titles is that of the International Court of Justice in
the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case.' The court used history to test the particular application of general international
law rather than to show an exceptional right which violates
general norms of international law. This premise was adopted
with regard to straight baselines in the Territorial Sea Convention: "[A] ceount may be taken, in determining particular
baselines, of economic interests peculiar to the region concerned, the reality and the importance of which are clearly
evidenced by a long usage.' 2. Viewed in this light, strict
proof of effective claims is not necessary. Substance, a close
link between the surrounding land and the water areas claimed
118. Head, supra note 113, at 216-18. That this is all one must show is supported
by Legal Status of Eastern Greenland Case (Denmark v. Norway), [1933]
P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 53 at 46; Island of Palmas Case (United States v.
Netherlands (1), 2 U.N.R.I.A.A. 829 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928).
119. See, e.g., Case Concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (merits)
(Portugal v. India), [1960] I.C.J. 6, 39-43; Colombian-Peruvian Asylum
Case, [1950] L.C.J. 266, 276-77. See also BLUM, supra note 105, at 238-40;
BOUCHEZ, supra note 106, at 281-82; but see Judge Alvarez's separate opinion
in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, where he says, "[Clomparatively
recent usage relating to the territorial sea may be of greater effect than
an ancient usage insufficiently proved." Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case,
[1951] I.C.J. 116, 152. See also McDouGAL & BURKE, supra note 88, at 572.
120. BLUM, eupra note 105, at 33840, and MCDOUGAL & BURKE, supra note 88,
at 357-59.
121. E.g., Statement of Bulgaria, [1960] Second United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea, Official Records 113.
122. Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, [1951] I.C.J. 116, 125-26, 134-39.
123. Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, art.
4(4), opened for signatureApril 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639,
516 U.N.T.S. 205. art. 7(6), which excepts historic bays from the normal
rules applicable to bays and specifically refers to straight baselines under
art. 4.
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as shown by long usage, becomes relevant to the decision. It
is precisely such long usage which is lacking with respect to
Canadian claims. The waters of the region are just now opening up for use, and such limited prior uses as whaling were
not exclusively local.124 Even now the local population will
receive only a small portion of the benefits of the proposed
new uses of the water or the wealth being found in the region.
Still, if past Canadian economic interests are minimal, there
are virtually no vested conflicting interests in the waters of
the area. In this sense, Canadian rights might still be given
special weight. In the large water areas involved, i.e., in
Hudson Bay, in the archipelago, and in the Arctic Ocean, innocent passage would not exist if an historic title were recognized.12 Uniquely Canadian interests would probably not be
great enough to result in general recognition of historic title
by international decision makers, except possibly with respect
to Hudson's Bay which could not be used as an international
navigation route.
D. Contiguous Zones.
The recent Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act prohibits pollution within 100 nautical miles of the Canadian
Arctic coast (north of 60' N) and in waters above the CanaPrime Minister Trudeau
dian Arctic continental shelf.'
denies that this is an assertion of sovereignty.127 It is, rather,
an assertion of control which would appear to be a new contiguous zone beyond Canadian territorial waters. Contiguous
zones have a long and troubled history.2 They are an assertion of control beyond the marginal belt of territorial waters
124.

HACKWORTH, supra note 112.

125.

BLUM, supra note 105, at 296-307. This position can be traced back to
colonial days in Canada. La Forest, CanadianInland Waters of the Atlantic
Provinces and the Bay of Fundy Incident, 1 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 149, 150-52
(1963). The absence of a right of innocent passage is the principle distinction between internal waters and territorial sea. COLOMBOS, supra note 99,
at 78; McDOUGAL & BURKE, supra note 88, at 64, 121; and OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 460-61, 581-82 (8th ed. 1955).

126. Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act §§ 3, 4(1), 18-19 Eliz. 2, c. 47
(Can. 1970), reprinted in 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 543 (1970), and 69
MICH. L. REV. 38 (1970).
127. 114 H.C. DES. 5955 (Apr. 16, 1970), supra note 117.
128. See, e.g., MASTERSON, JURISDICTION IN THE MARGINAL SEA

(1929),

for a

study of the special jurisdiction for customs purposes. See also, COLOMBOS,
supra note 99, at 136-46; McDOUGAL & BURKE, supra note 88, at 75-81, 565729.
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in order to protect the coastal state from specific injuries by
acts occurring on the high seas. 129 Such specific controls are
often preferable to extensions of the territorial sea, an "unnecessarily blunt and rigid instrument ... unreasonably restricting the equally legitimate inclusive interests of the rest
The validity of such assertions has been
of the world." '
judged by a standard of reasonableness. This requires a
multifactorial analysis weighing the protection of the contiguous state's interest against the cost to the interests of all
other states." 1 This is an imprecise measure of validity whose
very imprecision tends to encourage conflict. In an apparent
attempt to clarify the rights of both contiguous and noncontiguous states, Article 24 of the Territorial Sea Convention3 2
was drafted. It prescribes that contiguous zones may be established for customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary regulations but that such zones may not extend beyond twelve miles
from the baseline of the territorial sea. These and other limitations in Article 24 have not been accepted in practice. Contiguous zones continue to be used for other purposes. 3 and
well beyond the twelve mile limit. 3 4
129. Church v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187 (1804).
130. Feliciano, Comments on the Territorial Waters of Archipelagos, 1 PHIL.
INT'L L.$. 157, 164 (1962).
131. McDOUGAL & BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 578-81 (1962),
gives a thorough analysis of this process.
132. Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, opened
for signature April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S.
205.
133. An example of such other purpose is exclusive fishing zones 16 U.S.C. §§
1091-94 (1970). This is so despite the inclusion of freedom of fishing as
one of the freedoms of the high seas in art. 2 of the Geneva Convention on
the High Seas, opened for signature April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S.
No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82. An additional common use is for security zones.
Control
FRIEDMAN, LiSSITZYN, & PUGH, INTERNATIONAL LAW 615-16 (1969).
of pirate broadcasting is another use. Hunnings, Pirate Broadcasting in
European Waters, 14 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 410 (1965); Van Panhuys & Van
Encle Boas, Legal Aspects of Pirate Broadcasting :A Dutch Approach,
60 AM. J. INT'L L. 303 (1966). Cf. McDOUGAL & BuRKE, supra note 131, at
608-21; Oda, The Concept of a Contiguous Zone, 11 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 131
(1962).
134. The unreality of a narrow, sharply defined limit for such zones has been
commented upon by many. See, e.g., 1 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY
AS INTERPRETED AND

APPLIED BY THE UNITED

STATES 462

(2d ed.

1945);

McDOUGAL & BURKE, supra note 131, at 606-07; Gottlieb, supra note 85, at
59-67; Jessup, The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 59
COLUM. L. REV. 234, 244 (1959); and Legault, supra note 117, at 219. Zones
more than 12 miles wide measured from the baseline of the territorial sea
may well be inherent in the acceptance of the 12 mile territorial sea. Comment, The CanadianArctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act: An Analysis,
31 LA. L. REV. 632, 642 n.71 (1971).
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Canada has long had contiguous zones for control of
smuggling. 5 ' Canada also played a leading role in the development of exclusive fisheries jurisdiction beyond the territorial sea.1"' Both of these claims, along with prior pollution
laws, asserted authority only over waters up to twelve miles
from Canadian coasts. Canada, however, joined with the
United States in establishing an Air Defense Identification
Zone (ADIZ).. 7 over the high sea approaches to North
America well' beyond the twelve miles.'
Canada has not
bound itself to Article 24 even as a matter of customary law."3 9
Neither is the United States (at present the principal counterclaimant) well placed to invoke Article 24. In instituting
ADIZ, the United States established a contiguous zone well
beyond twelve miles from its shore. Its hovering acts still
reach for customs purposes to 62 miles from shore.1 4 In the
case of fishery zones, the United States protested Canada's
enactment of a nine mile fishery zone in 1964 but followed
suit two years later. Thus far the United States has extended
its general pollution control authority only over a contiguous
zone out to twelve miles.'
With pressure building up from
the environmental lobby, it would not be surprising if the
United States also emulates the Canadian Arctic pollution
example. In this regard, much will depend on what happens
at the upcoming Stockholm and Geneva Conferences.
135. This originated in the "hovering acts" of the various colonies before federation, preserved by the British North America Act, 30 Vict., c. III, § 122,
(1867) and consolidated and extended by Acts of the Canadian Parliament
in 1877, 1883, 1886, and 1906. MASTERSON, supra note 128, at 166-68. This
was re-enacted in the Customs Act of 1937, CAN. REv. STAT. c. 58 (1952). See
also Croft v. Dunphy, [1933] A.C. 156 (P. C. 1932).
136. Treaty of London, signed Oct. 20, 1818 by the United States and the United
Kingdom, 8 Stat. 248, T.S. No. 112 (1819). This eventually gave rise to
the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbitration, [1916] Hague Court Reports (Scott) 141 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1910). Finally, broad fishing zones
were established. Order in Council of Dec. 26, 1970, 104 Can. Gazette, No.
52, reprinted in 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 438 (1971). See generally Gottlieb, supra, note 85.
137. Hereinafter referred to as ADIZ.
138. 4 WHITEMAN, supra note 109, at 495-96; McDougal & Schlei, The Hydrogen
Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful Measures for Security, 64 YALE L.J.
648, 677 (1955).
139. Cf. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v.
Denmark and the Netherlands), [1969] I.C.J. 3, reprinted in 8 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS

340 (1969).

140. 19 U.S.C. § 1701 (1970). For a discussion of the events leading to this law,
enacted in 1935, see 4 WHITEMAN, supra note 109, at 489-93.
141. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1161(a) (9), (b), 1162 (a) (1970). See generally Healy &
Paulsen, Marine Oil Pollution and the Water Quality Act of 1970, 1 J.
MARITIME L. & COMMERCE 537 (1970).
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The effect of such claims as precedent for other more
exclusive claims underlies most opposition to them. Overlapping contiguous zones established for various purposes
tend to coalesce into territorial sea or historic water claims.' 4 2
Single contiguous zones have become the basis for subsequent
territorial claims. 4 ' Even where the nation making the claim
clearly intends only a limited and justified interference in
the freedom of the seas, it finds its limited claim cited as
precedent for unreasonably broad claims by others.'4 4
Narrowly viewed, the Canadian precedent is not alarming. The Canadians seek to regulate waters along their coast
in order to prevent a serious threat to their environment.
There is strong international precedent for regulation of
pollution, particularly oil pollution. The Canadian action
merely goes one step further.14 The Canadian claim is presented in a particularly appealing context.'4 6 'There is very
little traffic, and even this traffic is a recent development.
On the other hand, the damage from even a single accident
would be catastrophic. Whatever traffic develops must be
dependent on expensive and extensive cooperation from Canadian authorities. Other Canadian interests may be as nascent
as the international interests, but they can only add weight
on Canada's side of the balance. With Canadian interests
being maximal and world community interests in the waters
minimal,'4 7 the Canadian claim may be accepted.
142. See, e.g., SYATAUW,

SOME NEWLY ESTABLISHED ASIAN NATIONS AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 196-97 (1961); Dellapenna, supra

note 92, at 58. See also McDoUGAL & BURKE, supra note 131, at 621-30;
Comment, supra note 134.
143. An example is the Russian territorial claim. BUTLER, THE LAW OF
SOVIET TERRITORIAL WATERS 3-6, 28-31 (1967). This has been called "Craven's
Law of Creeping Jurisdiction." See Comment, supra note 134, at 648.
144. See Canadian Note of April 16, 1970, reprinted in 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS
607, 609 (1970). See generally Bilder, The Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act: New Stresses on the Law of the Sea, 69 MIcH. L, REV.

1, 25-27 (1970); Ratiner, United States Ocean Policy: An Analysis, 2 J.
MARITIME L. & COMMERCE 225, 227-32 (1971).
145. Wilkes, InternationalAdministrative Due Process and Control of PollutionThe Canadian Arctic Waters Example, 2 J. MARITIME L. & COMMERCE 499,
603-07 (1971).
146. Bilder, supra note 144, at 23, suggests that the Canadians chose the Arctic
in order to be sure of getting acceptance of a precedent which could later be
extended to other coasts. Cf. Legault, supra note 117, at 219-20.
147. To the extent government owned ships are in fact exempted from the application of the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, which is possible by
order of the Governor in Council (§ 12(2)), the principal present nonCanadian use of the waters (largely submarine navigation) would not even
be affected by the asserted Canadian control, particularly as the waters
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Other states have sought to prevent a race to appropriate
the seas by asserting, or accepting, only carefully circumscribed claims to the sea. What becomes precedent, however,
is the doctrinal basis for the claim and not the details of the
particular claim accepted.14 The basis asserted for this type of
action is far more alarming than the claim itself. The Canadians assert that the action is in self-defense.14 This is the
oldest and broadest basis for interference with free passage. If
this is accepted, any passage which threatens pollution cannot
6
be innocent."'
This gives a new, somewhat artificial meaning
to self-defense in a context where it has been used to mean
military threats. It would be a doctrinal basis for virtually
destroying innocent or free passage on the high seas over vast
areas of water because of the threat of pollution affecting
some contiguous state.'' To accept this expanded definition
is to accept the demise of freedom of the seas.
Accepting the claim while rejecting its basis.52 does not
entirely solve the problem. Any unprecedented claim of
coastal-state discretion to define its power in contiguous seas
becomes precedent for claims of complete unilateral discretion
to do so. This is more clearly so when the action runs counter
to a recent codification of international law which established
would remain high seas where submarines would be entitled to navigate
submerged. Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone, art. 14(6), opened for signature April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606,
T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
148. Ratiner, supra note 144, at 227-29. This analysis particularly focuses on the
problems which ensued from the United States continental shelf which soon
mushroomed into claims of epicontinental seas or even assertions that
coastal states have unlimited discretion to define their own territorial seas.
See, e.g., The Declaration of Montevideo, supra note 84.
149. Canadian Note, supra note 144, at 610. See also Beesley, Rights and Responsibilities of Arctic Coastal States: The Canadian View, 3 J. MARITIME
L. & COMMERCE 1, 8 (1971) ; Gold, Pollution of the Sea and International
Law: A CanadianPerspective, 3 J. MARITIME L. & COMMERCE 13, 36 (1971);
Legault, supra note 117, at 219-20.
150. Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, art.
14 (4), opened for signature April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639,
516 U.N.T.S. 205. See also Legault, supra note 117, 219-20.
151. See Henkin, Arctic Anti-Pollution: Does Canada Make-or Break- InternationalLaw?, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 131, 133-34 (1971). This is not necessarily
defined by 100 mile limits as Canada did. In the Arctic, 100 miles may not
actually be sufficient protection, Wilkes, supra note 145, at 510. Other attempts at defining limits for functional zones have, up to now, failed. See
Friedmann, Selden Redvivus-Towards a Partition of the Sea, 65 AM. J.
INT'L L. 757 (1971); Gottlieb, The Canadian Contribution to the Concept
of a Fishing Zone in InternationalLaw, 2 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 55, 65 (1964).
See McDOUGAL & BURKE, supra note 131, at 187-269, for an exhaustive
treatment of the policies relevant to denying passage off one's coast.
152. Cf. Gold, supra note 149, at 37.
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clear and well defined rules concerning the issues at hand. 5 '
That the failure of this codification was evident long before
the Canadian action does not prevent the action from becoming a bad precedent. The freedom of the seas is under attack.' 4
No nation which strongly champions that freedom can be expected to embrace the Canadian action. The power realities
of the situation dictate acquiescence in the enforcement of
the claim even while formally protesting it. Simply by withholding its cooperation, Canada can make navigation in
most of the affected waters virtually impossible. Even the
lives of the crews would be endangered. Navigation for commercial purposes-at present, conventional surface navigation
-is only possible in these waters on terms acceptable to
Canada. These realities require the recognition of a Canadian National Sea Route, at least until international processes
afford protection to the interests involved. The concept of a
national sea route was originated by the Soviets with reference
It appears to be a species of soverto their Arctic waters.'
eignty akin to historic title but also reflecting the unusual
geographical and climatic conditions. Such assertions treat
directly the problems posed-ships must be led through the
passage while their presence threatens to pollute the waters
and adjacent lands. Canada need not lead such ships unless
they accept reasonable conditions set down by Canada. As expressed in the Canadian note to the United States, "While the
Canadian Government is determined to open up the Northwest Passage to safe navigation, it cannot accept the suggestion that the Northwest Passage constitutes high seas." 5 6
E. Straight Baselines
Prior to World War II, the baseline from which the territorial sea was measured was almost invariably the actual
coastline of the claimant state. An effort by various scholars
to suggest a different baseline for mid-ocean archipelagos
153. Bilder, supra note 144, at 26-30.
154. For a short reasoned development of this attack see Christy, Marine Resources and the Freedom of the Seas, 8 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 424 (1968).
155. BUTLER, supra note 143, at 81-85. For the Northwind Incident see Pharand,
supra note 115, at 15-16. See note 198 infra.
156. Canadian Note, supra note 144, at 611.
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received almost no political support. It was not incorporated
into the 1930 Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea. 5 ' Not
even scholars seemed concerned with islands which merely
formed a fringe along the coast of a continental nation. All
this changed with the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case.'5 8
The FisheriesCase involved a dispute which arose when
Norway sought to exclude foreign fishermen from its territorial sea measured from straight baselines drawn between
islands, rocks or low tide elevations off its mainland. Although this system had some nineteenth century antecedents,
it was first completely expressed in a 1935 decree. The baselines, stretching in total about 600 miles, ranged in length from
about 100 yards to 44 miles. No baseline was more than 15
miles from land. 5 ' Some of these waters were bays which
could have been enclosed under traditional historic waters
doctrine. Other water areas were not bays but, nonetheless,
were historic waters. Still other water areas constituted new
claims. The claim thus presented "an ill-defined geographic
whole.' 16 The International Court of Justice had little difficulty deciding that the Norwegian claim was valid,' perhaps influenced by the meagerness of actual Norwegian gains
over what they would have had under the strictest application
of traditional norms.' 8 2 The court indicated three criteria to
be considered when judging the validity of any particular
system of baselines.' 6 ' First, the baselines must not depart
to any appreciable extent from the general direction of the
coast. Second, the sea areas so limited must be sufficiently
157. For a brief outline of these attempts see McDouGAL & BURKE, supra note
131, at 415-16. Of course, most such island groups were then colonies, and
the colonial powers necessarily favored the maximum possible high seas
area without any need to bother about the possible benefits such a norm
might have for the natives. For a discussion of this problem with regard
to the Philippines see Dellapenna, The Philippines Territorial Water Claim
In International Law, 5 J. LAW & EcoN. Dav. 45, 53-54 (1970). See SYATAUW, supra note 142, at 170-72 for a discussion of the problem with regard
to Indonesia.
158. [1951) I.C.J. 116.
159. Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, I.C.J. Pleadings 86-89 (1951). But Boggs,
Delimitationsof SeawardAreas Under National Jurisdiction,45 AM. J. INT'L
L. 240, 249 (1951) asserts that the furthest distance from land was five
miles.
160. Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, supra note 159, at 141.
161. The vote was 10-2 on the principle and 8-4 on the particular baselines used.
162. Boggs, supra note 159, at 249.
163. Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, supra note 158, at 133.
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linked to the land as to be subject to the regime of internal
waters. This rule is to be liberally applied to coasts as jagged
as that of Norway. Third is the reality of economic interests
peculiar to the region, the importance of which is evidenced
by long usage. These criteria were embodied in Article 4 of
the Territorial Sea Convention'6 4 with certain modifications.
Article 5(2) introduced a substantial change: innocent passage is preserved in waters which were not historically internal. This results in an assimilation of such waters to the territorial sea. The baseline no longer will mark the limit between territorial waters (where passage is a right) and inland
waters (where passage is at sufferance).
Canada has apparently asserted an archipelago claim to
the waters between its Arctic islands in a recent note to the
United States." 5 The nature and extent of this claim is unclear. No straight baselines have been established in the
area. 6 ' The Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act can even
be seen as a weakening or abandonment of such a claim." 7
There is statutory authority for establishing such baselines.6 8
There has been some political 6 ' and scholarly17 support for
such a move. It seems unlikely for at least the immediate
future. Such a move is possible if Canada cannot get acceptance of its contiguous zone or if resources in the water become
exploitable. Such a comprehensive assertion of authority
would provide sufficient control to prevent pollution in much
164. Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, arts.
4(1), 4(2), 4(4), opened for signature April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606,
T.I.A.S. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
165. See quoted material note 116 supra.
166. This is in contrast with the proclamation of fishery closing lines farther
south (on Dec. 26, 1970). See note 136 supra.
167. See, e.g., the remarks of Mr. Stanfield, 114 H.C. DEB. 5941-43 (Apr. 16,
1970).
168. The Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act, 13 Eliz., c. 22, § 5 (Can. 1964).
169. See Bilder, supra note 144, at 7 n.21, for a summary.
170. See, e.g., Pharand, The Waters of the Canadian Arctic Islands, 3 OTTAWA
L. REV. 414 (1969). His proposal that the island be treated as two archipelagos separated by the Parry Channel with a strip of high seas through
the channel (id. at 429-32), is meaningful only if Canada had retained a
three mile wide territorial sea; having gone to a 12 mile territorial sea, there
would remain no continuous strip of high seas even under Pharand's proposal. The elimination of this alternative excuses a discussion of the complex question of whether the same rules apply to mid-ocean archipelagos
as apply to coastal ones. Id.

at 427-29. See also McDOUGAL & BURKE, supra

note 131, at 411-19; Morin, Les progres technique, la pollution et l'evolution
recente du droite de la mer au Canada, particulierement a'l'egard de I'
Artique, 8 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 158, 239-43 (1971).
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the same manner as a 12 mile territorial sea does. It would
not, however, limit resources exploitation to Canadians, as
most fishing would probably occur outside the archipelago. It
would also be highly controversial since none of the other
baselines except in the most excepArctic states accept such
171
circumstances.
tional
Unfortunately, criteria derived from customary law or
the Territorial Sea Convention for judging the validity for
such claims do not realistically reflect the interests of the
claimant states. Thus, that the baselines not depart from the
general direction of the coast is a subjective decision. 172 The
general direction varies with the scale of map used and with
Thus Donat Pharand's
one's interpretation of the concept.'
argument that the general direction of the Canadian Arctic
Coast is east-west, from which baselines ncluding the Queen
Elizabeth Island would depart,"' is true only if one is looking
at a large scale map and considering only the mainland. In
contrast, the International Court in the Anglo-Norwegian
Fisheries Case considered the islands themselves to be the
actual Norwegian coast."7 5 The idea inartfully expresses that
the enclosed waters should be closely related to the adjacent
land. Put another way, the baselines should not stray too far
from land. 7 ' This does not require that there be a maximum
length to baselines.' 7 If a mathematical formula were to be
171. For the United States position see 4 WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 274-307 (1965).
172. McDouGAL & BURKE, supra note 131, at 408-11; Pharand, supra note 170,
at 422-23. But see Evensen, The Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case and Its
Legal Consequences, 46 AM. J. INT'L L. 609, 629 (1952). Evenson, counsel
for Norway in that case, concludes that this is the only principal of general
value as a guide to conduct. See also 4 WHITEMAN, supra note 171, at 173.
173. Contrast the interpretations of the Philippines found in Dellapenna, supra
note 157, at 59-61 with SYATAUW, supra note 142, at 188, and Head, Canadian Claims to TerritorialSovereignty in the Arctic Regions, 9 McGILL L.J.
200, 219 (1963).
174. Pharand, aupra note 170, at 430.
175. [1951] I.C.J. 116, 127.
176. A similar policy is embraced in the Geneva Convention on the Territorial
Sea and the Contiguous Zone, art. 4 (3), opened for signature April 29, 1958,
15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205. This prohibited the
use of low-tide elevations as basepoints. This also makes basepoints always
visible so navigators can ascertain where they are. McDouGAL & BURKE,
supra note 131, at 400-01.
177. The contrary statement is'uncomfortably common. Thus the I.L.C.'s Committee of Experts recommended to 10 miles maximum length. McDour.AL &
BURKE, supra note 131, at 403-04. At the 1958 Conferences a majority, but
less than two thirds, voted in favor of a 15 mile limit. Id. at 406. See also
4 WHITEMAN, supra note 171, at 167-68; Pharand, supra note 170, at 430.
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adopted, it might better refer to a maximum distance of the
baseline from land' 7 8 As it stands, this criterion remains
vague and abstract.
The second criterion is that the waters be sufficiently
and closely linked to the adjacent land as to be subject to the
regime of internal waters. While this is also a vague and
imprecise phrase, it apparently was used in the Fisheries Case
to mean that the coastal state ought to be entitled to complete
control of access to these waters by all shipping, even if in
innocent passage.' 7 9 Although this criterion is repeated in the
1958 Convention, 8 ' that same convention provides for the
preservation of innocent passage in such internal waters
which were not historically internal.'
This not only assimilates the waters in question to the territorial sea, it renders
this criterion meaningless. It amounts to a recognition that,
generally speaking, these controversies have been over resources, not over control of passage. In Canada's case, however, precisely the opposite is true. Only by insisting that
the Fisheries Case, and not the Convention, represents the
current state of customary law,"' can Canada give content to
this criterion and gain absolute control of access to these
waters by instituting territorial sea straight baselines.
The third criterion-long established local economic interests-focuses on the point primarily at issue in most disputes. Curiously, whereas the International Court required
such interests to justify baselines,' 3 the Convention down178. See Dellapenna, supra note 157, at 60. McDOUGAL & BURKE, supra note 131,
at 404, describes the failure of the I.L.C. to propose that baselines be no
more than two miles from the coast. The longest Canadian fisheries closing
line is 97 miles long and up to 48 miles from the nearest land. See Order in
Council, supra note 136.
179.

McDouGAL & BURIE, supra note 131, at 120-25, 410. See also the statements

of Lauterpacht and Franscois in 1954 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM. 67, 196-97.
180. Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, art.
4(2), opened for signature April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639,
516 U.N.T.S. 205.
181. Id. art. 5(2). This point is occasionally overlooked. E.g., Comment, International Law: Implications of the Opening of the Northwest Passage, 75

DICK. L. REV. 678, 688-90 (1970).
182.

This alone binds Canada. See Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and

the Contiguous Zone, opened for signature April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606,
T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205. Cf. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases,
supra note 139, at 42-46.

182. Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, supra note 175, at 133. See also Evenson,
supra note 172, at 613.
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4
graded them to something of which" account may be taken."
Thus the only criterion which had any real relevance to the
questions then in issue was relegated to a purely secondary
role. This is to Canada's advantage for she has no such economic interests. To rely on the Convention would require
an acceptance of innocent passage in these waters. To rely
on the Fisheries Case as stating the applicable law would require proof of long established local economic ties which
simply do not exist. This poses a dilemma, the avoidance of
which perhaps explains Canada's reluctance to assert -such a
claim.' s

The many uncertainties which appear upon careful examination of the superficially definite body of norms governing
resort to such baselines move some commentators to fall back
While this reasonon a general notion of reasonableness.'
ableness test can be said to underlie all law, it hardly produces

sufficient guidelines to minimize conflict. Such a test or the
ambiguous criteria used in the International Court or the

Convention could only be tolerable if there was a neutral
third party to whom resort for prompt decision were possible.
With the structural defects in the jurisdiction of the International Court, this is problematical at best. Canada has effectively precluded this by adding a new exception to its acceptance of the optional compulsory jurisdiction of the court. This
would probably cover Arctic straight baselines. It clearly
covers contiguous zones for fishing and conservation." 7 In
184. Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, art.
4(4), opened for signature April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639,
516 U.N.T.S. 205.
185. This dilemma exists unless all passage threatening pollution, i.e., all passage,
is non-innocent. See notes 149-51 supra and accompanying text.
186. Pharand, supra note 170, at 425. McDougal sees reasonableness as the
summation of all law of the sea. McDougal, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and
The InternationalLaw of the Sea, 49 AM. J. INT'L L. 356, 359 (1955); McDougal & Schlei, supra note 138, at 660 (1955). The predictive value of
such a norm is not explored.
187. The exception reads:
[O]ther than . . . disputes arising out of or concerning jurisdiction or rights claimed or exercised by Canada in respect of the
conservation, management or exploitation of the living resources of
the sea, or in respect of the prevention or control of pollution or
contamination of the marine environment in marine areas adjacent
to the coast of Canada.
Reprinted in 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 598-99. See statements of the Prime
Minister with regard to the declaration. Id. at 602-04. See also MacDonald,
The New CanadianDeclarationof Acceptance of the Compulsory Jurisdiction
of the InternationalCourt of Justice, 8 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 3.
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view of the difficulties surrounding such claims and of Canadian reluctance to trust such questions to the court, an even
more explicit exception may be expected if it were felt that
the present exception was unclear with regard to archipelagic
claims.
F. Sectors
A theory of territorial sovereignty which is practically
unique +o the Arctic is the sector theory. 8 This theory accords territorial sovereignty over the sector marked off by
the north coast of each Arctic state and the longitudes at
each extremity of that base up to the pole. Only the Soviets
seem to have expressly adopted this theory."8 9 In practice it
seems to be accepted by all with regard to land discovered within each country's sector, although no more such discoveries
are likely. Even this is relatively recent. Canada's sovereignty over Sverdrup Island in the Canadian sector was disputed
by Norway as recently as 1930,19 while Canada claimed sovereignty over Wrangel Island in the Soviet sector until 1924.191
Attempts to apply the theory to ice or water have been much
more controversial in theory. In practice it seems never to
have been tried.
The theoretical difficulties center around the problem of
the juridical nature of the Arctic pack ice. Many older theorists, envisoning a stable, permanent, immobile block of ice
covering the entire polar region, asserted that it should be
treated as land, not sea.192 More recent scholars have generally
188. Attempts to extend it to the Antarctic have been almost universally rejected.
See COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 130-31 (6th ed. 1967) ;
Note, Polar Problems and InternationalLaw, 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 746, 755-59

(1958).
189. Butler, supra note 143, at 79-85; COLOMBOS, supra note 188, at 29-130;
Lakhtine, Rights over the Arctic, 24 AM. J. INT'L L. 712 (1930).
190.

Lawford, CanadianPractice in InternationalLaw during 1963, 2 CAN. Y.B.
INT'L L. 271, 284 (1964); 1 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

463 n.72 (1940).
191. Head, supra note 173, at 208.
192. E.g., Balch, The Arctic and Antarctic Regions and the Law of Nations, 4
AM. J. INT'L L. 265 (1910); Head, supra note 173, at 220-24; Lakhtine,
supra note 189, at 712.
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recognized that the ice is in fact mobile."' Occupation must
generally be quite temporary. While long-term occupation of
the ice is possible, the freedoms recognized in the high seas.. 4
are generally exercisable in the Arctic Ocean as well. Navigation of sorts is generally possible. Overflight is the most easily
Fish are not yet generand commonly exercised freedom.'
ally available in commercial quantities despite their gradual
northward movement. The laying of cable or pipelines is at
least possible. An undersea pipeline has even been suggested
as the remedy for the problem of access to the north slope oil.
Scientific research, while not an enumerated freedom, is also
freely carried on in the Arctic. Most of those activities which
give the high seas their peculiar juridical character pertain
to the Arctic Ocean as well as to temperate seas. It is difficult to see any merit in a claim that the Arctic Ocean is, juridically more akin to land than to water. Moreover, the entrances to the Arctic are not so narrow as to preclude nonadjacent states from access. Neither geography nor practice
suggests that the Arctic be treated as a closed sea to be partitioned among the adjacent states.' 96
In practice all the Arctic states treat most of the Arctic
Ocean as high seas. The Americans, the Canadians and the
Soviets have all drifted ice flows well outside their respective
sectors.' Submarines also navigate without regard to sectors.
Surface navigation is similarly treated. The celebrated Northwind Incident involved a strait less than 24 miles wide rather
than the open seas. 9s Overflight by Arctic and even non193. E.g., Clute, The Ownership of the North Pole, 5 CAN. BAR REv. 19 (1927);
1 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE
UNITED STATES 348 (2d. ed. 1945); Pharand, Freedom of the Seas in the
Arctic Ocean, 19 U. TORONTO L.J. 210, 233 (1969) ; TARACOUZIO, SOVIETS IN
THE ARCTIC 349-59 (1938).
194. Geneva Convention on the High Seas, art. 2(1), opened for signature
April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
195. No right of innocent overflight exists in the territorial sea McDOUGAL &
BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 1099-1100 (1962).
196. For general discussions of this theory see COLOMBOS, supra note 188, at
191-96; 4 WHITEMAN, supra note 131, at 189-92. BUTLER, supra note 143,
at 19-24, 79-85, 93-94, discusses this theory of Soviet publicists as to closed
seas which would in their view include the Arctic seas close to the U.S.S.R.;
but Barents and Bering Seas are considered open as is the Arctic Ocean
proper.
197. Head, supra note 173, at 222 n.119; Pharand, supra note 193, at 229.
198. Here the Soviets forced two United States Coastguard cutters to turn back
from an attempt to use the Northeast passage. See BUTLER, supra note 143,
at 84; Pharand, supra note 193, at 229.
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Arctic states also pays no attention to sectors, although it
may be affected by special contiguous zones (ADIZ). While
the other freedoms have only been experimentally exercised,
if at all, all the adjacent states have denied that they have
ever applied the sector theory to the Arctic waters. 9 ' The
conclusion seems inescapable that the sector theory would not
be accepted by international decision makers if Canada were
to attempt to assert it with respect to Arctic waters.
IV

CONCLUSION

With the opening of the Arctic to navigation, the adjacent coastal states have to face the threat of serious environmental degradation. The Canadian government has asserted
a functional jurisdiction to an arbitrarily determined limit
in the form of a 100 mile contiguous zone. Such zones historically have tended to ripen into territorial seas. As such, the
claim would be internationally unacceptable. Even without
such an evolution, the assertion of a broad contiguous zone
tends to encourage other, usually far less reasonable, contiguous zones which probably would ripen into territorial sea
claims. On the other hand, conventional surface navigation
is impossible along a route several thousand miles long without the active cooperation of the Canadian government. This
makes the situation in the Canadian Arctic unique. The normal application of doctrines usually asserted with regard to
the high seas is not suitable. This Canadian national sea route
must be closely regulated by Canada. Preferably, this should
be part of a comprehensive international regulation of the
Arctic. Such cooperation in the past has not occurred. Nothing in recent international experience suggests a change
in this pattern. The novelty of some of the claims Canada is
making, e.g., to prescribe ship construction standards for ships
which will never enter Canadian territorial waters, appears
to cast doubt on the validity of at least part of her claims."°°
199. For the clearest disclaimer by Canada see the statement of the Minister of
Northern Affairs and National Resources Lesage, 7 [1956] H.C. DEB. 6955.
QA 0. Cf. Henkin, supre note 151, at 132-33. Wilkes, InternationalAdministrative
Due Process and Control of Pollution-The Canadian Arctic Waters
Example, 2 J. MARITIME L. & COMMERCE, 499, 507-10, 536 (1971) suggests
other grounds for questioning its validity, but generally concludes that it
is valid.
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Canada's claims would be less dangerous to the United
States and other adverse nations if asserted on less broad
bases. Reliance on a 12 mile wide marginal belt for control
would be inadequate for specific navigational controls..'
along its national sea route. Historic waters come much closer
to achieving the goals of the Canadian government, while
stressing the unique nature of the Canadian claim. Weaknesses in the theory of historic title and the vagueness of the
territorial limits of such a claim make action under it doubtful. Neither of the two traditional claims generally recognized
in the sea will assure achievement of Canadian claims.
Of the more innovative territorial claims, the sector
theory sweeps too broadly. Not only would it be bad precedent for other seas, but it would seriously interfere with aviation and nonconventional and submarine navigation. These
need not burden the Canadian government. They do not now.
The straight baselines (archipelagic) approach, comes closest
to achieving what contiguous zones achieve. It broadly asserts
jurisdiction over the conventional surface navigation routes
without sweeping far out into the Arctic Ocean. It particularly protects the most vulnerable area of the Canadian
Arctic-the complex of islands and shallow, narrow seas off
its north coast. What is lost by abandoning the territorial
sweep of the contiguous zone are the waters where environmental crisis is less likely to occur. This is more than compensated for by the greater certainty of the claim and strong
trend in favor of straight baselines to consolidate uncertain
historic title, or complex coastal features, into manageable
legal regimes in the sea. It would not spawn a new doctrinal
basis for extreme claims in the sea. A system of straight baseline running along the outer edges of the Canadian mainland
and islands as limited by the Convention on the Territorial
Sea would be a more reasonable, but still effective, solution
to the Canadian anxiety over the Arctic environment and
control of their national sea route.

201, An example would be specific sea lanes outside the marginal belt. •
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